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As we can understand with the spread of GVCs, a lot of new questions emerge regarding the 
measurement of participation and positioning in the globalised production process. The World 
Development Report (WDR) 2020 explains the GVC phenomenon and then focus on 
participation and the prospects especially in a world of change in technology. From the 
overview section, we can figure out that nowadays, goods and services flow across borders as 
intermediate inputs rather than final goods. In traditional trade, we need two countries with the 
notions of export and import. However, in GVC trade, the goods and services cross borders 
multiple times requiring more than two countries. Remarkable improvements in information, 
communication, and transport technologies have made it possible to fragment production 
across national boundaries. So the question is: how to conceptualise this type of new trade to 
justify the measurement of participation. 
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Conceptualisation of GVC 
Strengthening of trade liberalisation with continuing reduction of transportation cost, 
revolution in the information and communications technology (ICT), and some recent policy 
reforms are expanding the scope of globalisation (Antras, 2015). Indeed it is forming a complex 
network called ‘Global Value Chains’ (GVCs) through the distribution of designing, procuring 
parts & components, and assembly across several countries’ firms in different sectors. In a 
proper sense, GVC is a series of production stages of goods & services adding value from 
initial conception to final consumption with at least two stages in different countries. It can 
take spider-like (convergence of parts) and snake-like (sequence of parts) compositions 
(Baldwin and Venables, 2013) with the task-level division of labour having great productive 
use of resources across countries, sectors, and firms. For example, bicycles go through 
designing, prototyping, and conception work in Italy, producing parts and components in Italy, 
China, Japan, Malaysia, and many countries, and then assembling of all inputs in Taiwan and 
China. This efficient organisation of bicycle value chain using different parts and components 
around the world results in a low-cost & high-quality bicycle to the consumer (Kalm et al., 
2013; OECD, 2013). This type of globalisation can stimulate industrialisation in developing 
countries by giving access to a broad market, cheaper & better inputs, technologies, and 
management practices. However, GVC is not wholly a new thing because a significant 
proportion of world trade in raw materials and intermediate inputs has been hinting at this 
phenomenon. Although the growth of GVCs with augmented global trade & investment 
outpacing economic output increased from 1990 to 2008, the 2008 financial crisis and its 
consequent recessionary conditions disturbed its organisation, causing cyclical and structural 
economic uncertainties.    
 
 
Measuring GVC Participation 
We can understand that with the spread of GVCs, a lot of new questions arise about the 
measurement of participation and positioning in the globalised production process. From the 
earlier section, we can figure out that nowadays goods and services flow across borders as 
intermediate inputs rather than the final goods. In traditional trade, we need two countries with 
the notions of export and import. However, in GVC trade, the goods and services cross borders 
multiple times requiring more than two countries. So the question is: how to conceptualise this 
type of new trade to justify the measurement of participation & position. There is a concept 
called ‘import to export’ (Baldwin & Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015), i.e. use of imported content (in 
terms of value-added embodied in materials, intermediate inputs or tasks) for exports at the 
country-industry-firm level. There is one difficulty in using this notion to measure GVC 
participation. Because the well-known customs data to measure standard trade is not enough 
to answer the questions of the GVC trade phenomenon regarding how the exported goods and 
services are produced and how it will be used in importing country. Hence the issue of 
measurement is that the traditional trade statistics do not represent an adequate picture of 
supply and demand linkages among the economies. 
We need new data, new methods, and new tools for a full description of a country’s exposure 
to world demand. Here the new data are global input-output tables (involving customs data and 
national input-output tables). The national input-output (IO) tables are the production and 
consumption structures within an economy. If we generalise these national IO tables to describe 
the sale and purchase relationships between producers and consumers within and between 
economies, then we get the global or inter-country IO (ICIO) tables. In a national IO table, 
exports are sales to the ‘foreign sector’; in an ICIO table, exports are to country 1, county 2, 
and like this. The most widely used ICIO tables are OECD-Trade in Value Added (TiVA), 
World Input-Output Database (WIOD), EORA-MRIO.  World Development Report 2020 has 
used the EORA data because of its most substantial country coverage for the most prolonged 
period. However, its sectoral coverage is more aggregate and so less accurate than the WIOD 
and TiVA databases (Lenzen et al., 2012; Borin and Mancini, 2019; Johnson, 2018). The new 
methods are related to a better understanding of value-added and GVC trade at aggregate, 
bilateral and bilateral-sectoral level trade. These methods answer how to measure VA content 
at the aggregate, bilateral and bilateral-sectoral level, depending on the specific empirical issue 
developing a measure of GVC-related trade reconciling large part of the existing literature 
under one framework. The new tools are the R and Stata programs for economic analysis with 
ICIO tables.  
In this context of measuring GVC trade (Borin and Mancini, 2019) in total world trade (as a 
share of trade that flows through at least two borders), usually, two measures are used: 
backward and forward GVC participation. Backward GVC participation shows a country's 
exports embody value added that it has previously imported from abroad. Whereas, forward 
GVC participation shows a country's exports are not fully absorbed in the importing country, 
and instead are embodied in the importing country's exports to third countries. In other words, 
GVC participation is termed as ‘backward’ if the intermediate inputs are from the preceding 
stage of production and termed ‘forward’ if the exporter is at the early stage of production. For 
example, India exports aluminium tubing to Taiwan and China, where it is further used in the 
production of the bicycle later exported. Here India's participation is considered as forward, 
and China & Taiwan participate in a backward way. These computations are based on the 
global input-output tables with broadly defined sectors (scaled-up versions of product-level 
studies like the bicycle) and strong assumptions regarding the flow of intermediate inputs (De 
Gortari, 2019). In practice, the GVC phenomenon is all about firm-level international trade. 
This firm-level phenomenon raises some new issues concerning the heterogeneity in terms of 
productivity across firms and intrafirm trading hints about different types of buyer-seller 
relations (Johnson, 2018).  
 
Evolution of GVC Participation 
The overall percentage of GVC trade in the whole international trade (comprising both forward 
& backward participation) increased quite significantly from 1990 to 2008. Although it seems 
to have stagnated or even dwindled in the last decade, yet about half of international trade looks 
to be linked to global value chains. In the case of India, the share of GVC trade improved from 
25 per cent to around 35 per cent during the same period. The forward participation mainly 
dominates it. Nevertheless, the growth of backward participation rose more from around 8 per 
cent to 16 per cent. 
The WDR 2020 has sequentially classified four types of GVC participation (considering 
country sizes) on the basis of (1) sectoral specialisation of exports (based on domestic value 
added in gross exports of primary goods, manufacturing, and business services); (2) extent of 
GVC participation (measured as backward integration of the manufacturing sector as share of 
the country's total exports, i.e. backward manufacturing), where higher backward integration 
in manufacturing is an essential characteristic of countries entering or specialised in non-
commodity GVCs; and (3) measures of innovation (intellectual property or IP receipts as a 
percentage of GDP and research and development or R&D intensity, defined as its expenditure 
of public and private R&D as a percentage of GDP). The formulated taxonomy is 
Commodities, Limited manufacturing, Advanced manufacturing and services, and Innovative 
activities. The "Commodities" is defined as the manufacturing share of total domestic value 
added in exports is less than 60 per cent with backward manufacturing less than 20 per cent, 
10 per cent, and 7.5 per cent for small, medium, and large countries respectively. These criteria 
ensure that manufacturing is a small share of exports and that backward linkages in 
manufacturing are limited. This group is further divided into low participation, limited 
commodities, and high commodities based on less than 20 per cent, equal to or greater than 20 
per cent but less than 40 per cent, and equal to or greater than 40 per cent respectively in 
primary goods' share of total domestic value added in exports. These criteria define countries 
according to their export dependence on manufacturing. ‘Innovative activities’ (based on 
remaining countries) is defined for small countries as equal to or greater than 0.15 per cent in 
IP receipts & 1.5 per cent R&D expenditure of GDP and for medium & large countries as equal 
to or greater than 0.1 per cent in IP receipts & 1 per cent R&D expenditure of GDP. These 
criteria split groups into those that spend a relatively large share of GDP on research and receive 
a large share of GDP from intellectual property. ‘Advanced manufacturing and services’ (based 
on remaining countries) are defined as the share of manufacturing and business services in 
total domestic value added in exports is equal to or greater than 80 per cent. It is again 
categorised for small, medium, and large countries based on backward manufacturing is equal 
to or greater than 30 per cent, 20 per cent, and 15 per cent respectively. Here business services 
include maintenance and repair; wholesale trade; retail trade; transport; post and 
telecommunications; and financial intermediation and business activities. Business services 
rather than total services were used to detect advanced countries with a developed services 
sector. Lastly, the ‘limited manufacturing’ is defined on the rest of the sample. 
It looks like a ladder of GVC upgradation where on average Commodities have the highest 
scope for the forward participation due to being used in various downstream production 
processes. Limited manufacturing has lower forward participation than the backward 
participation, and Advanced manufacturing & services have the highest scope for backward 
participation. Innovative activities in this sense are exceptional with slightly lower backward 
participation as these are less reliant on imported inputs. 
  
GVC Participation across Regions, Countries, Sectors, and Firms 
Mainly developed countries of North America, Western Europe, and East Asia dominate in 
GVCs of advanced manufacturing and services, whereas Africa, Central Asia, and Latin 
America are mostly in commodities and limited manufacturing GVCs. India belongs to the 
Advanced manufacturing & services category. Between 1990 and 2015, many countries 
transitioned up into more sophisticated GVCs.  It is also interesting that South Asia, Latin 
America, Middle East, and Africa regions increased globally in GVC activities. Whereas, 
Europe and East Asia regions expanded the GVC activities regionally. Indeed, a handful of 
countries drive the GVC expansion. Though developed countries (Germany, USA, Japan, Italy, 
and France) intensified GVC growth using imported components in their exports, China 
significantly scaled up GVC growth in terms of its share of international trade.  
The sectoral composition of GVC participation is very much diverse. Some sectors have 
contributed heavily to GVCs for decades. Although on average the essential sectors with 
intensive use of resources and imported inputs (chemicals, petroleum, metals, rubber, and 
plastics) have increased GVC participation over time, textiles and leather have decreased to 
some extent. In services, construction and transport-related activities have performed well. 
High-tech manufacturing sectors (downstream industries like electrical and optical equipment, 
transport equipment, and machinery) intensified GVC through increased use of imported 
inputs. Whereas, low-tech manufacturing sectors (upstream industries like mining and coke) 
scaled up GVC in terms of a growing share of international trade over the period. GVCs have 
also increased rapidly in the service sector. As GVC is about trade in tasks, MNCs also 
outsource service tasks. These services (transportation, telecommunication, and financial 
services) act as facilitation and coordination of geographically fragmented production process 
across sectors. The developed countries (France, Germany, Italy, UK, and USA) contribute 
more than half of value-added exports. India’s expanding GVC role in ICT and Business 
services is genuinely remarkable. 
As firms, not countries or industries participate in world trade, the last two decades of economic 
research has seen the importance of data availability and theoretical transformation regarding 
firm-level trade studies. In this literature, firm heterogeneity in terms of productivity leads to 
export & import decisions. It implies to the stylised fact that on average, a small share (15 per 
cent of all trading firms) of big import-export firms (two-way traders) dominate international 
trade (80 per cent of total trade) across countries. Therefore, they dominate GVC participation 
as ‘superstar’ or ‘lead’ firms setting up networks of upstream and downstream economic 
activities. Nevertheless, intensive measures of firm-level GVC participation are challenging. 
Besides this, the emergence of this firm-level GVCs under sunk costs, customisation, limited 
contractual security leads to stickiness among firms relating to matching buyers and sellers, 
relationship-specific investments, flows of intangibles. In other words, the identity of the 
economic agents participating in a GVC is crucial, and within GVCs relationships are more 
likely to show persistence. These relational aspects of the growth of GVCs also exemplify 
intrafirm trade flows. At the global level, intrafirm trade has contributed about one third of 
world trade flows. With the firm-level approach, one can also distinguish between ‘producer-
driven’ (like Apple) and ‘buyer-driven’ (like Walmart) GVCs based on the complexity of 
products, the ability to codify transactions, and the capabilities of supply firms.  
Generally, MNCs control these relational contracting concerning market-seeking investment 
and efficiency-seeking investment. Both forces of the globalised production process are crucial 
for the alignment between GVC participation and FDI flows. Though there is a positive 
correlation between FDI inflows and GVC participation in both high-income and low- & 
middle-income countries, FDI outflows are relatively high for high-income countries with 
GVC growth.  
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